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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/07/2011

Accident number: 773

Accident time: 09:05

Accident Date: 25/08/2007

Where it occurred: AF/0102/00347,
MF0056, Chinar
Village, Dehsabz
District of Kabul
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: None

ID original source: (26)

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 19/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON [Demining
group] DT- 01 ON 25 AUGUST 2007
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team by the Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) and a BOI by the Chief
of Operations were convened to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] a
deminer from [Demining group] DT- 01. The accident occurred at 09:05 hours on 25 August
2007 at task # AF/0102/00347, MF0056 located in Chinar village, Dehsabz district of Kabul
province.
SUMMARY:
The mentioned task is part of SHA # 4 of impacted community #1079 which is contaminated
by AP mines. The clearance of the task was started by [Demining group] DT-01 on 7 July
2007. On 25 August 2007 at 0905 hrs while [the Victim] a deminer of Party-01, Section-1 of
the mentioned team was working in his clearance lane on a detected signal his bayonet
stroke on top of an anti personnel PMN-2 mine; as a result the mine exploded and since
helmet was not on his head, the victim deminer lost one eye, sustained serious injuries to
other eye and some injuries to his face and hand with active bleeding.
The casualty was first shifted to Eye Hospital, and after 20 minutes delay he was shifted to
Emergency Hospital. After 30 minutes as per requirement he was shifted again to the Eyes
Hospital, and as per recommendations of the doctors that there is possibility of losing his
other eye, the casualty was shifted to Peshawar of Pakistan for more treatments.
CONCLUSIONS:
The following points were found by investigation team:
•

The loss of deminer’s one eye, serious injuries on face and other eye; also not being
any sign of explosion on the visor of the victim deminer reveal that helmet was not on
his head, and that is why he sustained such serious injuries and loss of one eye.

•

Excavation drill was not practiced in accordance with SOP because the deminer
without considering excavation safety distance and excavation depth has worked
directly on centre of the located signal which shows lack of proper training for the
team.

•

Team leader and relevant section leader has failed to notify the deminer to wear the
visor, and not to practice such wrong excavation drill which shows lack of command
and control in the team.

•

The team leader and relevant section leader claim that as a result of explosion the
victim Deminer’s bayonet has been thrown away and has been missed, so the
investigation team could not see the bayonet to find and see any sign of explosion on
it. So they are not sure whether the victim deminer was using the bayonet or another
tool for excavation of the reading.

•

The accident occurred at 09:05 am and the AMAC investigation team reached to the
site at the same day at 10:45 am, but team all members had already left the site and
hand tools of the victim deminer were also shifted from accident site to the team base
camp.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

Refresher training, focusing on excavation drills, is recommended to be conducted for
the team.

•

The team command group has to strictly control the deminers to be dressed with PPE
and their visors.

•

Command group should strictly control the deminers, do not permit practicing
incorrect drill, and ensure that they are working in accordance with set procedures
and NGO SOP.

•

[Demining group] field supervisor and OPS Officer are recommended to visit the
teams’ worksites more frequently in order to identify operational failures in site and
avoid their occurrence in future.

•

The team command group must not disturb the accident point, not to remove the
accident involved equipment form site and remain at site till arrival of investigation
team to the site.

•

As [Demining group] management did not take any disciplinary action on the previous
demining accident which took place with the same team. So it is recommended that
the commend group of the team should be immediately demoted and qualified
replacements should be appointed for the team.

Victim Report
Victim number: 959

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Eye; severe Face; severe Hand
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eye
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . the victim deminer lost one eye,
sustained serious injuries to other eye and some injuries to his face and hand with active
bleeding".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the field controllers had failed to correct the Victim’s errors and had
removed evidence of the accident before the investigation, possibly to conceal the tool that
was in use at the time.
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The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators found that the
deminers needed training in safe excavation drills as they appear in the demining group’s
SOPs. Failure to provide effective training is also a significant Management Control
Inadequacy.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater
responsibility.
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